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"Mark this well, ye proud men of action! Ye 
are, after all, nothing but unconscious 
instruments of the men of thought"  
(Heinrich Heine) 
 
 
Abstract: Despite its influence in Central European sociology, N. Luhmann’s Social 
Systems theory remains a marginal branch of international sociology. In this paper, 
the theory questions the reasons for its own marginality in general and for its 
marginality in the Anglophone centers of sociology in particular, with the latter still 
being a surprise against the background of the theory’s cybernetic roots in the US. 
The theory arrives at the conclusion that, while Europe, or ‘the continent’, is still 
perceived as old compared with the Anglophone new world(s), it still is Anglophone 
sociology that preserves ‘Old European’ semantics. Sociology in continental ‘Old 
Europe’, however, seems to have a chance of slowly being acquainted with a new, 
post-enlightenment mindset focused on semantics and communication rather than on 
humans and action.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 I owe much to the comments and ideas of Isabelle Clerc, Dr. Lukas Scheiber, Martin Kuhn, and Prof. 
Sandro Cattacin 
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I  – The Periphery of the Center and the Secret Center of the Periphery 
 
Immediately after the release of ‘Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft’ (Luhmann, 1997), 
the German key medium DIE ZEIT headlined a ‘Farewell of Old Europe’ and estimated 
the book as the opus magnum of one of the most outstanding sociologists of the 20th 
century (Brunkhorst, 1997). Without any doubt, N. Luhmann’s œuvre had a lasting 
influence upon the intellectual life of a number of European countries (the German-
speaking countries, Scandinavia and Italy, in the first instance; cf. Arnoldi, 2001; Seidl 
and Becker, 2006) as well as the fundamentals of the most diverse disciplines (including 
philosophy, theology, management studies, political or education sciences, psychology, 
and, last but not least, sociology), which is why Luhmann is mentioned in the same 
breath as P. Bourdieu, A. Giddens, M. Foucault, U. Beck and J. Habermas (cf. 
Outhwaite, 2009: 1034; Seidl and Becker, 2006: 10).  
However, even N. Luhmann’s most convinced followers2 cannot help but assess the 
only regional influence exerted by his Social Systems theory, which “has largely lost in 
the competition for chairs, research funds and publishing programs against the cognition 
sciences, to whose foundation it contributed” (cf. Baecker, 2005: 11)3. This “lamentably 
low visibility of Niklas Luhmann’s work in the Anglophone world” (Bergthaller and 
Schinko, 2011: 5) is also reflected by the fact that his writings have neither been ranked 
in the ‘ISA top 10 books’ (ISA, 1998)4 nor in the ‘Contemporary Sociology Top 10 
Books’ (CS, 1996), thus far. Theorists in social systems and their concepts hardly play 
any role in the contemporary sociological student textbooks (Keith and Ender, 2004; 
Macionis, 1988; Schrecker, 2008; Wagenaar, 2004). Also in his study on ‘Canon 
Formation in Late 20th-Century British Sociology’, W. Outhwaite (2009: 1030) lists Z. 
Baumann, U. Beck, P. Bourdieu and A. Giddens as representatives of the British canon 
while excluding N. Luhmann, but not without admitting that the in-group is only 
“proving a loose framework for analysis, rather than laying down formal categories in 
the manner of Parsons, Luhmann or Richard Münch. Giddens’ structuration theory, for 
example, is contingently rather than logically linked with his substantive analysis of 
class stratification, state power or globalization” (ibid, p. 1034). Again we find that N. 
Luhmann’s and further system theoretical approaches are perceived as logically strong 
but as not en vogue in the Anglophone centers of sociology, where theory per se has 
more than once in history been perceived as “a bad dream from which the discipline has 
                                                
2 To which H. Willke and D. Baecker are counted among (Turner, 2007). 
3  “(D)ie Systemtheorie hat die Konkurrenz um Lehrstühle, Forschungsmittel und Verlagsprogramme 
gegen die Kognitionswissenschaften, an deren Grundlegung sie mitgearbeitet hatte, weitgehend verloren, 
aber noch sind ihre Spuren nicht alle getilgt” (Viskovatoff, 1999: 482). 
4 ‘Social Systems’ ranks 29th, while in the top 10 we find M. Weber (rank 1), C. W. Mills, R. K. Merton, 
again Weber, P. L. Berger and T. Luckmann, P. Bourdieu, N. Elias, J. Habermas, T. Parsons, and E. 
Goffman (rank 10). With a second title on rank 24, Habermas outperforms Luhmann twice.  
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been awakened by the kiss of science” (Connell, 1997: 1539), i.e. a straightforward 
sphere of empiricism-driven concepts and decent middle-range theories.  
N. Luhmann (1984) obviously is not interested in exhibiting decent behavior in this 
vein: Already in the subtitle of the German version of his ‘Social Systems’ he pledges 
an ‘Outline of a General Theory’, i.e. a theory that  
 
“(D)oes claim universality for its grasp of its objects in the sense that as a sociological theory it deals with 
everything social and not sections (as for example strata and mobility, particularities of the modern 
society and patterns of interaction, etc.). Theories that claim universality are easily recognized by the fact 
that they appear as their own object. (If they wanted to exclude themselves, they would have to surrender 
the claim of universality.)” (Luhmann, 1995: : xlvii; cf. also Luhmann, 1984: 9).  
 
However, how could such a universal theory decide whether it works properly? “By 
expressively admitting other languages (theory projects). It tests its claim to universality 
by giving up its claim to exclusiveness. It is thus dependent on competing theories. We 
could call this principle inclusive competition” (Podak and Roberts, 1986: 58). 
Otherwise stated the question of the theory’s significance and standing is of utmost 
importance not only in the sense of theory politics or marketing, but also concerning its 
own architecture.  
Therefore, Social Systems Theory has to understand the situation it is in. As a theory 
of the social referring to itself as a merely social phenomenon, the only option it has to 
achieve this is communication, which is most briefly defined as the opposite of 
causality (cf. Baecker, 2012). “Communication means to be unsure about cause and 
effect” (Baecker, 2001: 60). The theory has, therefore, to tell a story for the reasons for 
its current marginality in the metropolises of sociology (Connell, 1997: 1535); and then 
wait and see whether and how this story is perceived and how it changes the relation 
between the theory and its environment. This is what the present paper will discuss. 
 
 
II – Social Systems Theory: The Heir of Macy 
 
The current marginality of Social Systems Theory in the relevant Anglophone 
discourses takes the theory by surprise considering the fact that, at least geographically, 
one of the major starting points was in the USA (Umpelby and Dent, 1999; Clerc, 
2010), i.e. the conferences the Macy Foundation sponsored between 1946 and 1953. In 
the course of this interdisciplinary series of conferences Circular Causal Feedback 
Mechanisms in Biological and Social Systems has been discussed before the face of an 
increasingly interested general public, which soon associated the aim of transferring the 
Macy concepts into the social and behavioral sciences with the label Cybernetics (Pias, 
2004). According to F. Fremont-Smith, Medical Director of the Macy Foundation, it 
was imperative to create new, circular concepts of causality in order to be able to 
Steffen Roth 
                 Journal of Sociocybernetics 9 (2011), pp. 19-34 22 
overcome the obstructive disciplinary gaps and to establish meaningful forms of 
communication between the sciences and the humanities, and thus, to prompt the 
creation of new knowledge on cybernetics: 
 
“Developments of the last few years in the field of mathematics and engineering with special reference to 
principles underlying computering machines and target seeking devices, when taken together with 
advances in the field of neurophysiology, promise to throw light upon the mechanisms underlying self-
correcting and purposeful behavior of individuals and of groups. This frame of reference should be of 
interest to those working in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, anthropology and sociology.” (Invitation 
letter from F. Fremont-Smith, 8. Februar 1946, reprinted in Pias, 2004)  
 
While the conference title could lead us to believe that the ‘Cybernetics’ was primarily 
concerned with ‘purposeful behavior’, conference protocols and records draw a 
different picture. The most outstanding academics of their time (W. McCulloch as 
chairman, N. Wiener, W. Pitts, G. Bateson, M. Mead, H. von Foerster, R. Carnap, R. 
Ashby and J. von Neumann; cf. Heims, 1991) discussed the problems and concepts of 
language, information, communication, coding, and general systems theory. What is 
striking about the Macy Denkkollektiv is that many of the participants referred to the 
New European discourses held in the context of the Wiener Kreis or the journal 
Erkenntnis in the 1920s and 1930s (Fleck, 2006). By this, the Macy conferences 
represented an imported hub for New European ideas that, in Europe itself, for the most 
part, did not survive the Fascist Era. This import included epistemological questions on 
the smallest units of action or information and on the functioning of communication. On 
following these and similar questions, Cybernetics soon was confronted with the above 
mentioned claim that an universal theory needs to appear as its own object and therefore 
already broke with the idea of objectivity or Archimedean points of view that a theory 
could self-evidently base on (cf. Hegselmann and Geo, 1991). In such way, Macy 
anticipated many figures of thought nowadays associated today with the Luhmannian 
Systems Theory, including the idea of seeing social systems as an ’organic’ system, 
capable of self-regulation“ (Jonas, 1953). 
Despite the fact that the call for paper was explicitly oriented to social scientists, we 
notice the absence of representatives of the sociological mainstream of these days. The 
only two sociologist who, for a short time at least, participated in the conference were P. 
Lazarsfeld, founding father of modern empirical social research, and the legendary T. 
Parsons (Arnoldi, 2001: 3), the second major US-American root of Luhmann’s Social 
Systems Theory5. 
                                                
5  “Various social scientists, mainly from the United States, made use of the concept of system, in 
particular since the periodic conferences instated by Grinker and Ruesch in Chicago during the 1950s (see 
Grinker, 1956). The participants freely used notions such as adaptation, autonomy, boundaries, 
communication nodes, effectors, energy system, environment, Gestalt, hierarchy, homeostasis, 
information, levels, processes of interaction and communication, open systems, organization, circularity 
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The question therefore remains as to why Social Systems Theory cannot come full 
circle in terms of an adequate reception in the Anglophone sociology.  
 
 
III – The nature of Anglophone Sociological Knowledge 
 
In the following discussion, the Theory will approach the problem of its own 
marginality as a game of sides: It will try to get a picture of Anglophone sociology’s 
self-reference as well as its perception of Social Systems Theory.   
The first step is the quest for ‘The nature of sociological knowledge’, which seems 
to be unknown even to authors of articles of the same name (Zolo, 1986; 
Vanderstraeten, 2002), who conclude that: 
 
“Sociological knowledge, it would seem, is much more akin to (…) historical science than any that 
resembles a natural science. The current challenge confronting our discipline is the assurance that the 
knowledge we produce is publicly relevant and empirically valid, not that it is necessarily scientific in a 
cumulative sense. The question is whether or not sociology as a discipline is poised and prepared to 
accept this challenge. As I have argued elsewhere (…), the future of the discipline rests with its strength 
as a profession, which like economics, law, psychology, education, and medicine, bridges the academic 
and public realms. The body of knowledge produced by sociology, it seems to me, is like that of law, 
evolving and changing through the interpretation and reinterpretation of an established social 
construction, albeit largely an empirical one of our own making. And like law, it would seem that 
sociology is much more akin to a profession than to a science”.  
 
In this sense, sociological knowledge results in a modesty that is developed to such 
extent that the discipline is publically advised to sound its (at least partial) retreat from 
the claim of being a science. Rather, sociologists should focus on their individual role as 
professional boundary spanners between academia and the public, with public 
expectations being the benchmark for sociological quality. Even if the theory might note 
that there is a certain tone of constructivism resonating in the paragraph cited, the 
construction of knowledge remains a matter of the individual ‘Sociologist as 
Ombudsman’ (ibid, p. 10), as which “(o)ne acts morally in the profession when one 
pursues work in a precise and concentrated manner with the intent to achieve an 
approximation of the ideal” (ibid, p. 12), i.e. “the ideal standards of the craft as a form 
of moral life” (ibid).  
Maybe, the present mindset and sense of mission might be perceived as featuring 
elements of a caricature. Of course, the idea of the scientific nature of sociology still 
                                                                                                                                          
of processes, rhythms, structures, steady state, stability, stress, threshold, etc., showing clearly the 
influence of the then developing cybernetics and systems theory. Among the most prominent participants 
were Deutsch, Parsons, Rapoport (one of the founders of the original Society for General Systems 
Research), Thompson and Weiss.” (Baecker, 2005: 11). 
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belongs to the hardcore of sociological knowledge, even at the level of introduction 
courses4 (Keith, 2006: 11). However, as of the 1920s, the constitutive idea of being the 
‘Practical Sociology of the Metropole’ still has a certain relevance in US-American 
sociology (Persell et al., 2007: 313). A strong focus on the applied, practical and actor-
based concepts can also be noted with regard to the British Islands, both in the context 
of a comparison between French and British student textbooks6 (Connell, 1997: 1535) 
and with regard to the British sociological canon formation (Schrecker, 2008). Thus, a 
common feature of both traditions is to flaunt a theory-skeptical attitude (Outhwaite, 
2009), which, in return, makes these sociologies more open to and, therefore, more 
dependent on what they perceive to be the everyday languages and the common senses 
already existent in the subjects and objects of their research. This, Social Systems 
Theory should bear in mind when being confronted with virtually all of the Old 
European concepts it aims to free from their role as guiding stars of social theory: 
humans, individuals, actions, responsibilities, beliefs, morals, values, decisions, et al. 
 
A second way to discover more about the foundations of Anglophone sociology is to 
shift the focus from its self-concept to the question of what can be learned from its 
contact with the new speak (Albrow, 1993: 85f; Outhwaite, 2009: 1034; Connell, 1997: 
1539) of Luhmannian theory. In other words, the theory tests its Anglophone 
environment by watching how the environment reacts to the theory’s own operations, 
this being a strategy that not only hopefully, but unavoidably, will change both the 
theory and its environment, at least as long as the theory is not completely ignored. At 
least, this is not the case: If actually regarded, then “Luhmann’s work is (…) subject to 
(…) heated theoretical and political debates both within and outside Germany” 
(Reckwitz, 2002: 257) with the tendency of dividing the respective contributors in 
supporters and antagonists. While for some authors Luhmann is the sociologist of the 
20th century, for others “Luhmann is perhaps, at best, an uninspiring ambassador of the 
complexity theory for much contemporary sociology; at worst, a distraction that slowed 
the utilization of the toolkit of complexity thinking within social theory and discouraged 
wider engagement in the rethinking of the concept of social system” (Arnoldi, 2001: 
12). 
 Between these two extremes, some significant typical reaction patterns to the theory 
can be identified (Walby, 2007: 457):  
 
“The responses to this highly complex, self-contained, and interconnected theoretical product have been 
several. One can distinguish several different kinds:  
1. Rejection of the theory as speculative and unscientific, insufficiently concerned with empirical 
verification (Viskovatoff, 1999: 482);  
                                                
6  Both introduction courses and textbooks are highly relevant in defining sociology’s public image, as 
for many people they remain the only more intense contact with sociology (François, 1999: 214). 
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2. Rejection of it on the grounds that it gives up humanistic, enlightenment, and emancipatory 
values, which should be maintained (Zolo, 1986; Wagner, 1994; Wagner, 1997) or because it 
abstracts from individuals to an absurd degree (Habermas, 1985; Miller, 1994);  
3. Use of the theory as a ‘toolbox, out of which one can take individual concepts and theorems 
depending on one’s immediate goals, without having to worry about the rest of the theory’ 
(Izuzquiza, 1990);  
4. Criticism of the theory from the perspective of general system theory, with the argument that 
what is constitutive of society is not communications but neural networks or some other 
biological entity (the papers collected in (Schimank, 1991: 579) or making some other 
modification of the theory from a natural science perspective (Leydesdorff 1996) while 
following Luhmann’s general method of theorizing;  
5. Full-fledged embrace, with little or no criticism of Luhmann’s fundamental theory (Schmidt, 
1987); 
6. Seeing the theory as currently the most advanced sociological theory and hence adopting it, 
while presenting it less ‘self-referentially’ than Luhmann or his close disciples do, not working 
wholly within it, and making connections between it and the sociological tradition (Willke, 
1992; Baecker, 1988)“. 
 
Within the Anglophone world, N. Luhmann’s œuvre predominantly received critiques 
of types 1 and 2. Interestingly, these represent the less relaxed and curious or just the 
more normative and ideological forms of critique, which is not what the theory expected 
as a reaction of a field displaying itself as a sociology based on empiricism and 
pragmatism, which would rather suggest to adopt an attitude as presented in type 3 or 5.  
In not following what it claims to be its guiding stars, Anglophone sociology gambles 
away its chances on what the following section of the article will discuss.  
 
 
IV – The Nature of Social Systems Thinking 
 
Responding to the mentioned question on What should students understand after taking 
an introduction to sociology, a leading US-American scholar stated, students should 
learn that “(t)he things we take granted as natural are really socially constructed, e.g. 
human nature” (Kiss, 1986; Kiss, 1989). Even though human nature isn’t nature it stays 
human nature. At the same time we might assume that  
 
“(A)s far as the politics of ideas is concerned probably the greatest obstacle to Luhmann’s approach was 
its self-characterization as systems theory. The word ‘system’ could serve to crystallize all the prejudices. 
(…) Luhmann did not have any good cards in the political battle of ideas, and he was to feel this in the 
following years. Seminar papers were able to manoeuvre him – simply through the associative elaboration 
of the modest conceptual repertoire, which I have quoted7 – against the wall, at which the theoretical 
‘defenders of the status quo’ had to await their theoretical execution” (Persell et al., 2007: 308). 
                                                
7  The authors, in plural despite the use of the individual personal pronoun, hence apparently the author 
and his translator, quoted J. Habermas. 
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Even twenty years after the situation described above by K. Podack and D. Roberts, 
scholars enter reputable journals with playing the same old keyboard of anti-
conservative associations. Merely to quote an example we refer to the D. Osterberg’s  
(Podak and Roberts, 1986: 55) discussion of Luhmann’s General Sociology, in which he 
devotes at least one-third of the paper on commenting on what he calls the “cynical” 
and “anti-left-wing tone of Luhmann’s writing” (ibid, p. 15) before agreeing with T. 
Parsons in calling the USSR’s “lack of differentiation between the economy and the 
polity” a “pre-modern trait, making the system less flexible and adaptive than that of the 
USA” (ibid, p. 19). In this very sense, US-American sociology appears to resembles a 
moral rather than a scientific adventure.  
The Theory therefore argues that critiques of the above-mentioned type 2 are 
scientifically irrelevant insofar as they refer to moral values (e.g. the emancipation of 
whomever) rather than to scientific categories. Taking serious a critique like this would 
mean the same as accepting that sociological truth were a matter of democracy or of 
divine right.  
The second line of attack refers to what is called a disregard of or an over-
abstraction from concrete humans, individuals or actions. However, in this respect, the 
theory cannot quite follow, because it addresses all these and many further concepts, 
namely as communicative events, i.e. as obviously relevant topics of communication; 
and then asks whether or not any theory did ever more than communicating the 
relevance of certain topics (behavior, action, folkways, colonialism, or the internet)8. In 
this sense, the theory can then (only) communicate its surprise that communication used 
to be a topic belonging to the core of sociological concepts discussed in the 1940s but 
which then has disappeared from the core until the 1990s (Osterberg, 2000)and has 
obviously been replaced by the concept of ‘(collective) behavior’ (Keith and Ender, 
2004: 27; cf. also Wagenaar, 2004). In any case, even an extensive mapping of 
Anglophone sociology can easily be performed without any reference to the concept of 
communication as of the 1970s (Keith and Ender, 2004: 27; Williams and MacLean, 
2005: 129).  
Whether or not there is a connection between the gap this disappearance left behind 
and the self-assessed loss of the importance of (Anglophone) sociology, the theory can 
only consider, at this point of time. However, it might be allowed to speculate this has 
to do with a feeling that “(s)ociology is largely out of evidence” (cf. Moody and Light, 
2006) and, thus, experiences grave image problems (ibid, p. 12): For “(t)here is no 
theory of the social” (Keith, 2006: 8), sociology is increasingly perceived as a second 
                                                
8  The only specific claim that the theory makes is that its topic is what makes the topic a topic, which is 
communication, i.e. the basic unit of society. In other words: like any other the theory, in fact, has a lot to 
say, not only but also about individuals, humans, actors, interactors, roles-takers, structure-makers, 
networking gate-keepers and organizational decision-makers. 
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string psychology “whose terrain is increasingly being taken up by cognitive science 
researchers. Even such a concept as trust is now in the hands of economists armed with 
brain scanning technology” (Podak and Roberts, 1986: 56). 
Contemporary Social Systems Theory, however, cannot simply surrender and accept 
to take the role of a marginal theory within an anyway marginal discipline for one 
reason: It has been “recently remarked that the biggest impact Luhmann made was that 
he made people feel that sociology was something special” (Turner, 2007: 359). Indeed, 
an independent subject matter is exactly what sociology needs, at least, unless it is 
prepared to accept the claim that “(s)ocial theory cannot get very far without making 
generous use of mentalistic or cognitive concepts. Even the identification of the domain 
of social theory, particularly its articulation as ‘sociology’, that is to say a special 
discipline concerned with the social, typically relies on cognitive concepts” (Arnoldi, 
2001: 12). It depends much on whether one accepts this statement as a true description 
of the working basis of sociology, or rather as an outline of the foundations of only one 
particular practice of Anglophone, or Old-European respectively, social sciences: 
In the first case, there always remains the problem that the social cannot appear but 
as footprints in the spheres of consciousness or cognition; in other words: if social 
theory is based on non-social foundations, then just like in the case of black holes in 
astronomy, social phenomena can only be observed indirectly through their interaction 
with other matters. If this indirect strategy of unveiling the social by adding or removing 
these or those of its non-social boundary conditions actually is considered the standard 
of doing social sciences, then this leaves us with the question of whether “the fashion 
for sociological approaches which attempt to reduce reliance on mental and cognitive 
concepts to a minimum (…) inadvertently show that weak notions of cognition and 
agency produce weak explanations and very limited understandings of the kinds of 
questions about the social world that social theory hast traditionally attempted to 
provide” (Turner, 2007: 357).  
As a result of his discussion of this traditional approach to the social, S. Turner 
(2007) draws the conclusion that social scientists should stop with trying and spotting 
the invisible, and rather start considering the potentials of ‘Social Theory as a Cognitive 
Neuroscience’. For contemporary Social Systems Theory the case would be clear then: 
If Anglophone social sciences follows this path, then the Anglophone scientific 
community has no need for social sciences that are independent from cognitive and 
natural sciences.  
In the second case, there is always the just mentioned alternative of defining an 
independent subject matter for social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, 
which is a task that also the Anglophone scientific community obviously has been 
trying to accomplish throughout the past decades. One instructive testimonial of this 
effort is discussed by S. Oishi, S. Kesebir and B.H. Snyder, who present the modified 
version of a Table drawn by E.C. Tolman (ibid: 359) that traces the dividing line 
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between psychology and sociology at the level of the ‘Types of Variables Typically 
Investigated in Sociology and Psychology9’ (1952):  
 
 
 
 
Table 1: The Types of Variables Typically Investigated in Sociology and 
Psychology (source: Oishi, Kesebir and Snyder 2009, p. 367). 
 
 
The perplexing aspect about this Table is that it compactly demonstrates that sociology 
or the social sciences are obviously perceived to be an ancillary science of cognitive 
sciences: Structures, institutions, organizations, etc., are conceptualized as explanans, 
whereas the explanandum clearly is individual behavior: actions, responses, and 
interpretations. In other words, sociology is conceptualized as a particular answer to the 
questions of what boundary conditions shape individual or collective behavior. Even if 
sociology were “the scientific study of interactions and relations among human beings” 
(cf. Table 1; source: Oishi et al., 2009: 367)10, then sociology would be the very 
opposite of the discussion of individual actions, responses or interpretations. And, even 
if it comes to collective behavior,  
 
                                                
9  Hereby “mainly referring to the mainstream social psychology that is mostly American in origin”  
(Oishi et al., 2009: 336) 
10  We still would have to discuss whether or not society is about the interaction of stomachs, intestines or 
brain cells. 
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“The unit being sought cannot merely be seen as a kind of ‘stapling together of what is different. Putting 
it that way meant underestimating the complexity of the relationship of ego and alter, and the emerging 
‘eigen-selectivity’ of this social system. Luhmann’s critique is especially directed against the work of 
George H. Mead – notwithstanding Parsons’ positive discussion of Mead as a classic author on this topic 
(…). Symbolic interactionism builds on a contingency acting alter into the ego and see, quite correctly, 
the process of mediation as the use of symbols. But it treats the problem only on one side of the 
interaction, assuming that all is the same on the other. It treats, so to speak, only half of the double 
contingency. It confines itself to ego’s actions, reflections, expectations and anticipations” (McIntyre, 
2004: 3). 
 
In contrast to this idea, for Social Systems Theory (Vanderstraeten, 2002: 85), social 
systems emerge “through (and only through) the fact that both partners experience 
double contingency, and that the indeterminability of such an situation for both partners 
in any activity that then takes place possesses significance for the formation of 
structures”. This, actually, is something completely different from the concept of 
‘action’, “because a constitutive feature of action is that it must be attributable to 
individuals” (Luhmann, 1995: 108). In this very sense, the goal of the sociological 
“analysis is to bring out sharply the non-psychic character of social systems. The 
autonomy of sociology demands that it not be reducible to the psychic. If we understand 
the psychic as the secularization and ‘scientisation’ of the subject, then the strategic 
meaning of Luhmann’s critique becomes apparent” (Vanderstraeten, 2002: 85). Finally, 
we find that social categories cannot be reduced to (the aggregation of) individual 
behavior, and thus, we need to ask again why social concepts like institutions, networks 
or organization should only be perceived as an explanans of individual behavior. In this 
sense, and with regard to the type 1 critique (unscientific theory, insufficient empirical 
verification et al.), the question also raised is why it is supposed to be more scientific or 
more empirical to assume that the social is nothing but a boundary condition of 
individual or collective behavior. And why algebra should be the only form of 
mathematics or of logics that sociology should be measured against, considering that 
Social Systems Theory is designed with a strong connection to G. Spencer-Brown’s 
‘Law of Forms’ (Podak and Roberts, 1986: 63), and consequently, to a form of 
mathematics that can treat not only the variables but also the meaning of operands as 
subject to change? In this very sense, we understand why Luhmann rejects the claim to 
the exclusive authority of the methodological standards of conventional (natural) 
sciences (Arnoldi, 2001: 4). Rather, he provides sociology not only with an independent 
subject matter, but also with a commensurable form of polymathematics or logics. 
Therefore, again, the empiristic triumph (Zolo, 1986: 116) of Anglophone social 
sciences is fine, but we really should consider the idea that social sciences demand 
forms of empiricism and methods that transcend the methods and logics of the natural 
sciences. Therefore, again, holding the view that the conventional concepts of 
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empiricism of the natural sciences were the benchmarks of sociology is, from our point 
of view, the most Old-European way of doing science.  
 
 
V – A Farewell from Old-Europe  
 
The major claim made in this paper is that there is no Old Europe except for the cases of 
European scholars copying the Anglophone ways of doing science. By saying this, 
Social Systems Theory does not imply any disregard of the value of the good Old 
European enlightenment values (Connell, 1997). Rather, it would like to state that these 
particular values are oriented to guide only particular forms of sciences (or knowledge 
politics). In other words, values are not an appropriate form of guidance for science, as 
science cannot rely on whatever the rules of the distinction between good and bad are, 
but only on the answer to the question of what is true or untrue. Sociology is therefore 
not about a reflection on good actors and positive actions (Bialasiewicz and Minca, 
2005; Baert and Turner, 2004). Rather, amorality can confidently considered a quality 
feature. Therefore, while there are maybe theories that are more likeable to the 
Anglophone ways of thinking, still Social Systems Theory has a logical right to argue 
that critiques of types 1 or 2 in the typology of the reactions on Social Systems Theory 
(i.e. the accusation of being a morally or empirically dubious theory) are both 
inappropriate and irrelevant. Rather, what the theory expects from Anglophone social 
sciences is a return to their own values of pragmatism and empiricism and, therefore, a 
closer and unbiased look at the theories …  just because a pragmatic and empirical 
approach would suggest to interact with a new theory in terms of a type 3 or 6 scenario 
(i.e. selectively using the theory as a new tool-kit and, maybe, using it in a way that 
sounds a little less like ‘new-speak’).  
What the Systems Theory learns from this excursion is that its problem is not the 
somehow naïve Anglophone mainstream of sociology or social sciences, but rather 
misinterpreted or naïve ideas of Systems Theory, including concepts stating that 
systems can be of a mixed nature, thus comprehending physical, psychological and 
social elements at the same time, just as presented by A. Pickel (Vanderstraeten, 2002; 
Podak and Roberts, 1986; Viskovatoff, 1999). Of course, such systems can be observed 
just like the actants in the actor-network theory (2007), however, the question still 
remained whether these obviously non-autopoietic systems provide an adequate level of 
analysis for sociological theories. 
For Anglophone social sciences, the case is as simple as it is to accept that society is 
not made of humans. The hero of sociology simply is neither man nor human. The hero 
of sociology is not even an actor anymore. The hero of 21st century sociology is 
communication. In this sense, we are living in post-heroic times. This, of course, is hard 
to accept:  
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“To an astonishing degree and more than all other, American sociology has positioned itself to a stand up 
for the Good and to accept the Bad, as best, as a form of ‘deviance’ that should be the target of social 
reform efforts. It perfectly copies the classic story of American movies: the Good has a terrible time, it 
almost fails against its adversaries; but in the end it triumphs against all odds, drives off in a shiny new 
car and gets a well earned kiss” (Law, 1992; Latour, 1987; Callon, 1995).  
 
All this involves an actor, which sociology as the science of the trans-individual, should 
quickly dispose, just because the price for remaining with the actor is already set: Social 
Theory as Cognitive Neuroscience (Turner, 2007), i.e. a situation that no sociologist can 
genuinely be in favor of. The alternative, of course, involves a narcissistic shock for 
man. However, well placed in the environment of social systems, man is much freer 
than he ever could be as the atom of society. By focusing on humans instead of 
communication, ironically it is, of all, those who make man the measure of all things 
who actually jail him in their moral, Old-European and well-meaning expectations. But, 
all too often, well meant is just the opposite of well done. Or rather: well communicated 
… 
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